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Abstract
We use rich microdata on bank robberies to estimate individual-level disutil-
ities of imprisonment. The identification rests on the money versus apprehension
trade-off that robbers face inside the bank when deciding whether to leave or col-
lect money for an additional minute. The distribution of the disutility of prison is
not degenerate, generating heterogeneity in behaviour. Our results show that unob-
served heterogeneity in robber ability is important for explaining outcomes in terms
of haul and arrest. Furthermore, higher ability robbers are found to have larger
disutilities, suggesting that increased sentence lengths might effectively target these
more harmful criminals.
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At least since Becker's 1968 seminal model of crime, economists have believed that
criminal decisions depend on individual probabilistic expectations about illegal proceeds,
risk of apprehension, and the consequent loss of utility associated with getting caught and
punished. Empirical measures of this heterogeneity, however, are scarce, since criminals'
expectations are not usually directly observable.1 Criminal proceeds are also typically not
observed,2 and because of data limitations the probabilities of arrest and conviction are
often assumed to be constant for a given crime, a given location, and a given time period.
With respect to the disutility of being imprisoned, data limitations are even more
severe. Disutility is likely to depend on a variety of unobserved factors (opportunity
cost of prison time, including market skills and potential legitimate earnings, aversion to
prison, aversion to risk, time preferences, family relations, friendships, etc.). Yet without
detailed micro-level data, most crime research has been forced to fully disregard such
heterogeneity. This is unfortunate as it has been shown that disutility shapes general
deterrence.3
The distribution of disutility is important because it impacts the efficacy of a given law
enforcement policy, and thus influences the design of optimal policy.4 For instance, het-
erogeneity in disutility implies that different policies may be necessary to effectively target
different offenders. Individuals with large disutilities of prison are likely to be responsive
to increases in the certainty or length of imprisonment. In contrast, for offenders at the
low end of the distribution, policies that raise the disutility of prison directly are likely
to be more effective. For example, increasing educational attainment (thereby improving
labour market outcomes) for individuals at risk of offending increases the opportunity
cost of offending and thus the disutility of prison (see Lochner, 2004 and Lochner and
Moretti, 2004).5
1For evidence on the formation of criminals' expectations, see Lochner (2007), Hjalmarsson (2009),
and Anwar and Loughran (2011).
2According to Witte (1980) [n]ew data sets should also make every possible effort to obtain estimates
of the expected payoff from illegal activity. Presently, very few crime datasets contain information on
the value of stolen goods. Victimization surveys are an exception, but they typically focus on the victims
and contain little information about criminal behaviour. The National Incident-Based Reporting System
(NIBRS) is among the few data sources with some statistics about criminal proceeds.
3See Polinsky and Shavell (1999) for a theoretical discussion about the importance of the disutility
of imprisonment, and also Lee and McCrary (2017) for some comparative statics results when changing
what they call the utility cost to incarceration.
4See Durlauf and Nagin (2011) for an overview on the estimated aggregate deterrence effect of
imprisonment.
5More recently, using data from Norway, Bhuller et al. (2016) find that for criminal offenders who
were not employed prior to being arrested, incarceration leads to lower rates of recidivism upon release,
compared to those who were not incarcerated. The authors attribute this to programs within the prisons
designed to rehabilitate, provide job training, and support re-entry into society. These programs, which
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Heterogeneity in disutility is also important in the context of sentence enhancements,
which increase prison sentences based on the circumstances of the offence. Sentence
enhancements are typically used to discourage crimes involving more harm (e.g., more
money is stolen or a firearm is used) or as a way of compensating for a lower probability
of apprehension (e.g., when a mask is worn to conceal a robber's identity). An additional
motivation for sentence enhancements is to target those individuals most responsive to
a change in punishment, thus increasing the efficiency of law enforcement (see Becker,
1968). To a limited extent this motivation is currently incorporated in some sentencing
decisions. For example, higher punishments are given for premeditated murder which is
more likely to respond to a change in sanctions compared to impulsive crimes of passion.
However, without a direct measure of this heterogeneity in disutility, it is not possible to
take full advantage of these differences.
The main contribution of this paper is to estimate heterogeneity in the disutility
of prison, and thus individual deterrence, using data on almost 5,000 individual bank
robberies that happened in Italy between 2005 and 2007. Each year there are more bank
robberies in Italy (approximately 3,000) than in the rest of Europe combined, with a
10% chance of victimization on average (there are about 30,000 bank branches). In the
Western world only Canada has a higher risk rate, defined as the number of robberies
divided by the number of bank branches.6 By comparison, according to the Uniform
Crime Statistics, the United States has a population more than five times that of Italy,
but only three times as many bank robberies (Weisel, 2007).7
Our data come from the Italian Banking Association, which records information on the
amount of seized cash and the exact duration of the robbery, as well as whether an arrest
has been made (and whether it was made immediately or after some time). Managers of
victimized Italian bank branches fill out a detailed survey describing the characteristics of
the robbery, including information on the number of robbers, list of weapons used, time
of day, number of employees and customers present, among others. In addition, the data
include detailed characteristics of each branch that was robbed, including the number and
type of security devices, whether a security guard was present, the location of the branch,
and the typical level of cash holdings.
lead to significantly higher rates of post-release employment, effectively increase the opportunity cost of
subsequent offending. Since the individuals affected were those previously unemployed, the policy targets
those who are likely to have lower opportunity costs to begin with.
6For an international comparison of robberies see the Online Appendix O1.
7In the US there are around 10,000 bank robberies per year, representing more than 10% of all
commercial robberies (Weisel, 2007; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007). See Cook, 2009, 1987, 1986,
1985, 1983 for a discussion of robberies more generally.
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By looking closely at heterogeneity in strategy and behaviour, this study combines
economic modelling with a unique set of detailed bank robbery data to study the interplay
between criminals and criminal law. The identification of the disutility of prison rests on a
trade-off faced by robbers: after selecting a bank branch, a weapon, a disguise, a team, etc.
(in short, a modus operandi), robbers need to choose how much time to spend inside the
bank collecting the money.8 Robberies represent an ideal laboratory for these trade-offs,
but there are a number of other crimes with similar intensive margins.9
The optimal robbery duration depends on robbers' expectations about the size of the
haul, the likelihood of apprehension, and the disutility of prison if caught. Criminals with
a higher expected marginal (per minute) haul, a lower expected risk of arrest (the hazard
rate of arrest), or a lower disutility of prison will want to spend more time collecting
money.10
Our rich dataset allows us to model individual-level expectations of criminals, con-
trolling for many factors that might influence all of these components. Using data on
realized hauls and arrests, we estimate the expected haul function and hazard of arrest.
Given estimates of these two objects we can use the information on the amount of time
robbers chose to stay in the bank to recover an estimate of the disutility of prison that
rationalizes this choice. We can do this calculation separately for each robbery, allowing
us to recover the distribution of disutility.
Since the returns to bank robbers are measured in terms of the size of the haul, our
measure of the disutility of prison is the compensating variation, which measures the price
an individual criminal would be willing to pay to avoid prison once arrested. We will refer
to the compensating variation more informally as the disutility of prison.
A second contribution of this paper recognizes that optimal criminal policy depends
not only on heterogeneity in the costs of enforcement (through heterogeneity in deterrence,
as in Mookherjee and Png, 1994), but also on heterogeneity in the benefits of enforcement
(through heterogeneity in criminal harmfulness, as in Polinsky and Shavell, 1992). The
detailed information on robbery characteristics in our data allows us to identify which
8More anecdotal evidence on this trade-off can be found in Cook (2009) and Bernasco (2010).
9Other examples include the decision of how long to spend burglarizing or committing theft, the
amount of money to embezzle, and the amount of time spent on the road as a drunk driver. In all of
these examples there is a trade-off between higher rewards and higher costs that depends on the intensity
of the crime.
10See Viscusi (1986) and Harbaugh et al. (2013) for other papers that empirically examine the trade-off
between the risk and rewards of criminal activity. Viscusi (1986) uses individual-level data on inner-city
minority youths in the United States to estimate risk premiums associated with different levels of risk of
punishment. Harbaugh et al. (2013) use an experimental design to examine the effect on criminal activity
of the rewards to crime, risk of getting caught, and the value of the punishment if caught.
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characteristics are associated with more harm to banks in terms of larger hauls and lower
rates of apprehension (thus increasing the chances of future robberies),11 as well as those
related to larger disutilities of prison.
While our data contain a wealth of information about each robbery, there is one
characteristic of the robberies that is inherently unobserved: robber ability. Individuals
with higher robber ability are likely to have larger hauls and lower arrest probabilities.
Their ability might also affect the disutility of prison, for example through an increased
opportunity cost of imprisonment.12 In order to deal with unobserved heterogeneity in
robber ability, we estimate the expected haul and hazard rate of arrest jointly, employing
a factor model to control for unobserved ability and the correlation it generates in terms
of outcomes (haul, apprehension, and robbery duration).13
We find that the most successful robbers in terms of hauls use weapons, wear masks,
and rob banks with fewer security devices and no guards. Those who work in groups,
wear masks, target banks around closing time, and target banks with no security guards
and few employees, achieve lower rates of apprehension. Offenders who use a mask and
target banks without security guards have higher disutilities of prison. Robber ability is
also found to be a strong driver of larger hauls, lower probabilities of arrest, and larger
disutilities of prison. The latter finding is consistent with higher ability offenders having
a larger opportunity cost of prison.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no other papers that estimate the entire dis-
tribution of the disutility of prison, although two other papers estimate some statistic
of the distribution.14 Abrams and Rohlfs (2011) use bail postings, the amounts paid by
suspects to be released while on trial, to estimate the average disutility of prison. Their
estimate of the disutility is $4,000 per year. They explain this low figure by saying that
(t)his seemingly low estimate may result in part because they pertain to a particularly
poor segment of the population. Credit constraints may also affect the estimate. Our
11In the context of bank robberies, harm could also include violence or threats of violence.
12Higher robber ability could be associated with higher opportunity costs of imprisonment for two
reasons. First, incarcerated individuals are not able to rob banks, the value of which depends on robbery
ability. Second, to the extent that robber ability is positively (negatively) correlated with an individual's
productivity in the legal sector, higher ability could increase (decrease) the opportunity cost of prison
through foregone legal employment.
13See Anderson and Rubin (1956) and Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975) for early discussions of factor
models and Heckman et al. (2006) for a more recent treatment in the context of risky behaviours (including
crime).
14In spirit this paper is also related to the vast literature that estimates the value of life based on
trade-offs between fatality risk and different kinds of returns, for example wage premia in the labor
market (Thaler and Rosen, 1976; Viscusi, 1993), or the saving of time when speeding (Ashenfelter and
Greenstone, 2004).
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paper goes beyond estimating the average disutility of prison by backing out its distri-
bution, and does not require information about, nor are the estimates affected by, credit
constraints. The second paper, Reilly et al. (2012), uses aggregate data to estimate an
average disutility of prison for British bank robbers that is larger (¿33,545), correspond-
ing to an average sentence of around 3 years. However, this estimate is also likely to be
biased due to aggregation.15
With not just one statistic but the entire distribution of disutility at hand, our res-
ults can be used to help policy-makers design sentencing enhancements to target those
characteristics associated with both more harm and larger deterrence.16 Our finding of
substantial dispersion in disutility across individuals implies heterogeneous responses to
policies designed to reduce crime. Furthermore, our estimates allow us to examine the re-
lationship between heterogeneity in disutility and heterogeneity in criminal harmfulness.
The correlation between these two measures of heterogeneity is important because if more
harmful crimes are committed by offenders with lower disutilities of prison, then policies
targeted at these individuals will be more costly, mitigating the net social benefit. If
instead the correlation goes in the other direction, then policies designed to reduce harm
and increase efficiency are complementary, leading to an amplification of the benefits of
enforcement.
We find that heterogeneity in robber ability generates a positive correlation between
criminal harmfulness and disutility. An importance consequence of this is that policies
designed to affect those with higher disutilities of prison (for example simply raising overall
sentences) have the added benefit of disproportionately targeting the more harmful (higher
ability) offenders.
15Reilly et al. (2012) compute an upper bound on the disutility of prison by setting the expected gains
from a robbery equal to zero. Their calculation involves dividing the average haul by the average odds of
arrest. However, when there is heterogeneity in the expected haul and probability of arrest, this ratio can
be seriously biased, as the average ratio is not equal to the ratio of averages. If these two expectations
are correlated with each other, for example due to heterogeneity in ability, then this can induce further
bias.
16Several recent studies have estimated average deterrence effects by exploiting some form of ran-
dom variation in sentencing (Drago et al., 2009, Helland and Tabarrok, 2007, and Kessler and Levitt,
1999although the results of the latter have been challenged by Webster et al., 2006 and Raphael, 2006).
However, they were forced to disregard any potential heterogeneity in the disutility of prison (e.g., due
to the opportunity cost of incarceration, aversion to prison, etc.). This study exploits the individual and
continuous trade-off to estimate the entire distribution of deterrence effects.
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1 The Data
We have been granted access to a unique dataset that covers the universe of individual
bank robberies perpetrated in Italy between 2005 and 2007.17 Each year branch man-
agers are required to record updated information about the characteristics of their branch
(number and type of security devices, presence of a guard, etc.). In addition, after each
robbery, branch managers are required to fill out a form describing specific details of the
robbery (e.g., number of bank robbers, total haul, weapons used, time of day). Managers
also have to record the exact duration of the robbery in minutes. All bank branches have
surveillance cameras that can be used to reconstruct the duration. The vast majority of
robberies are relatively short: 87% last 9 minutes or less, and over 95% are 30 minutes
or less. However, there is a very long right tail. Since these much longer robberies are
likely to follow a very different modus operandi (e.g., accessing the vault as opposed to
gathering the money from the tellers), we exclude the 4.3% of robberies that last more
than 30 minutes.18 We also drop those observations with missing information on either
the robbery or characteristics of the branch, leaving us with 4,969 observations out of an
initial 6,098.
The distribution of robberies over time is shown in Table 1, where we separate success-
ful (no arrest was made) from unsuccessful (an arrest was made) ones.19 At the beginning
of the robbery (time 0), the data start with 4,969 robberies that last less than 30 minutes.
Two hundred ninety-two last just one minute. Of these, 20 lead to an arrest and 272
do not. The latter are labelled as successful, even if the robbers walk out of the bank
empty-handed. After the first minute 4,677 robberies are left, of which 71 lead to an
arrest and 1,041 terminate without an arrest during the next minute, and so on. After 10
minutes only about 5% of the initial robberies are still ongoing.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for our dataset. Overall, 6.6% of bank robberies
led to an arrest.20 The average robbery lasts 4.27 minutes and leads to a haul of approx-
17Online Appendix O1 shows the evolution of robberies over the last 15 years and discusses the Italian
robberies in comparison to other countries, including the United States.
18Our results are very similar if we limit the data to robberies lasting less than 10 minutes.
19The data that were provided by the Italian Banking Association do not contain any information
about the arrested robbers, in particular whether or not they were ultimately convicted. As a robustness
check, we hand-collected data on all trials against bank robbers that ended between 2005 and 2007 in
the judiciary district of Turin (the second largest city in Northern Italy). These data, described in more
detail in Online Appendix O2, show that only one out of 96 robbers (covering 324 bank robberies) was
acquitted. Similar data based on commercial robberies perpetrated in Milan (not just against banks)
also show conviction rates that are close to one (see Mastrobuoni, 2014). Given this evidence we feel it
is reasonable to treat arrests as convictions.
20Fifty-nine percent of these arrests are in flagrante delicto, during the bank robbery, while the rest
7
imately e16,000. Given that more than half of all bank robberies involve two or more
perpetrators, the average haul per criminal is approximately equal to e8,700.
Only 15% of bank robberies involve firearms. In the United States the fraction is twice
as high, possibly because weapons are more widespread. But differences in the severity
of sentencing enhancements might also influence this difference. US federal guidelines
impose sentences for bank robbers of up to 20 years, with an additional 5 years (25%)
added when a dangerous weapon (e.g., a firearm) is used. In Italy, instead, the law (Art.
628 of the penal code) prescribes that the sentence length should range between 3 and 10
years for simple robberies and between 4.5 and 20 years for aggravated robberies, which
are robberies in which: a weapon is used, the robber uses a disguise, a group of robbers is
involved, violence is used to incapacitate a victim, or the robber belongs to an organized
crime association. Thus, sentencing enhancements when weapons are used are between
50% and 100 %, at least twice as large compared to the United States. Another 70% of
robbers use knives or makeshift weapons, while the remaining 15% use just threats and
no weapons, typically handing a note to the teller.
As in the United States, only about 40% of all bank robbers disguise themselves when
robbing a bank (this might again be a response to slightly larger sanctions for disguised
offenders). Some US states and US cities have introduced similar sentencing enhancements
against disguised robbers. For example, since 2007, in the city of Los Angeles, wearing a
disguise during a robbery comes with an additional 25% sentencing enhancement as well
as making the offender ineligible for any type of early release. In Massachusetts, masked
robbers face a minimum mandatory sentence of five years in state prison.
Our data also contain information about how the perpetrators reached the bank
premises. The majority of robbers reach the branch on foot (34%) or by car (20%).
Another 7% reach the branch using a motorbike, while the remaining 39% of robbers are
able to successfully hide their mode of transportation.
The data set is rich with information about the security devices installed in the bank.
We summarize this information by counting the number of different devices that each
bank employs and how many characteristics these devices have on average. For example,
92% of the banks have a security entrance, but the characteristics differ widely. Some
have metal detectors, some have double doors between which people can be trapped, some
have a biometric sensor, etc., while some entrances might display all these characteristics.
Two-thirds of these devices might not be visible (e.g., automatic banknote distributors,
banknote spotters, time-delayers, banknote tracing devices, vaults, and alarm systems)
happened after robbers exited the bank.
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while the rest are visible (e.g., metal detectors, vault time-locks, and protected teller
posts). On top of such devices about 8% of branches employ security guards.
The data also contain information on the number of customers and employees that
were present at the time of the robbery. On average there are about 5 employees and 3
customers.
We group robberies into 4 different time-of-day intervals. More than 60% of robberies
happen between 8am and noon, about 30% between noon and 3pm, and 8% around the
opening time (before 8am) or right before closing time (3pm to 4pm). Robberies are also
slightly more likely to happen on Friday than on other days of the week.21
2 A Continuous Time Model of Crime
The key insight of our model is that bank robbers face a trade-off when deciding how long
to stay in the bank. By staying an extra minute, the robbers can collect more money, but
they also run the risk of getting caught and sent to prison. The cost of being apprehended
is a function of the disutility each individual places on going to prison. By equating the
marginal benefit with the marginal cost of time spent in the bank, we can back out the
unobserved disutility that robbers assign to prison.
Conditional on having chosen to rob a bank, the criminal's expected utility V (t) is a
function of the duration t of the bank robbery. It is also a function of the criminal's initial
wealth (W ), discount factor (δ), risk aversion (r), as well as the trade-off between haul
and risk of apprehension, which in turn depend on ability, as well as the characteristics
of the chosen bank branch, which are predetermined once he starts the robbery.22
The precision of the robbers' expectations about the benefits and costs of spending an
additional minute inside the bank branch is likely to depend on their own experience. The
Turin judiciary data show that more than two-thirds of sentenced robbers are recidivists
(have already been convicted for a similar crime). On average, these recidivists are con-
victed for three additional bank robberies in trials taking place from 2005-2007. Moreover,
more than half of the remaining one-third of robbers that have no previous convictions are
sentenced for multiple robberies.23 Thus for only about 15% of robbers, law enforcement
21Since bank branches are supposed to be closed during weekends we disregard the few robberies that
happen on Saturday or Sunday.
22Harding (1990), for example, interviews almost 500 robbers and finds that most of them choose
whether to use a gun rationally, considering the benefits (improvement in outcomes) and costs (increase
in sanctions).
23In robberies against businesses in the city of Milan, the police try to identify offenders across robberies
using surveillance cameras and victim reports. Based on such data, 70% of robberies are performed by
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is unable to detect some previous experience, and even this level of inexperience is likely
to be biased upwards given that not all criminal acts can be observed.
Based on the robber's expectations, his decision problem can be formulated as:
max
t
V (t) = [1− Pr(Tp < t)]E [U (W + Y (t), δ)] + Pr(Tp < t)U˜ (W,d, S, δ) , (1)
where Y (t) is the haul after t minutes, Tp is a random variable denoting the time of police
arrival, and F (t) = Pr(Tp < t) represents the probability of apprehension before time t.
The random variable Tp defines the two states of the world, arrest (and conviction) Tp < t
and no arrest Tp ≥ t.24 E[U (W + Y (t), δ)] is the expected present-discounted utility
from no arrest and an uncertain haul after t minutes, where δ is a parameter (potentially
a vector of parameters) related to the discount function. U˜ (W,d, S, δ) is the present-
discounted utility if incarcerated for S years, where d is the yearly cost of incarceration.25
Conditional on the robber's expectations about Y (t) and F (t), different observed
durations could be driven by heterogeneity in U , W , δ, and d. It is convenient to simplify
this rather general formulation of the robber's maximization problem. Since most robbers
stay only a few minutes inside the bank, and since all of them have to face the first minute,
we approximate the utility they get at the very beginning of their criminal act. We start
by considering a first-order Taylor approximation around the time they enter the bank
branch (t = 0).26
With the first-order approximation one can divide the maximization problem by the
marginal utility of wealth at time 0, rearrange terms, and rewrite the maximization prob-
lem as:
max
t
[1− F (t)]E[Y ′(t)]t− F (t)D,
D = [U(W, δ)− U˜(W,d, S, δ)] ∂W
∂U(W, δ)
. (2)
recurrent offenders (Mastrobuoni, 2014).
24Robbers can also be arrested after exiting the bank (ex-post). To the extent that the amount of time
spent in the bank influences the probability of ex-post arrest, then this should also enter the maximization
problem. We also estimated an extended version of the model that took this into account, but the effect
of time spent in the bank on ex-post arrest was extremely small and statistically insignificant from zero.
As a result, we focus on the version of the model without this additional component.
25Here we are implicitly assuming that there is no uncertainty with respect to the sentence. For most of
the analysis this assumption is not necessary and one could simply rewrite the utility while incarcerated
U˜ (W,d, δ) as an expectation over the distribution of S.
26The approximation is U (W + Y (t), δ) ≈ U (W, δ) + ∂U(W,δ)∂W Y ′ (t) t, where Y ′ = ∂Y∂t , and at time 0
the haul is 0 (zero input, zero output), or Y (0) = 0.
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The difference, U (W, δ)−U˜ (W,d, S, δ), captures the utility change when incarceration
begins. By multiplying this expression by ∂W
∂U(W,δ)
, we transform this from utility into a
monetary measure, D, which we will define as the disutility of prison. D = D(U,W, d, δ)
measures the compensating variation, or the amount of money the robber would be willing
to pay to avoid the expected prison time. In Appendix B we show that under a few
additional assumptions, a similar relationship can be obtained using a second-order Taylor
approximation to the utility function. In this case the willingness-to-pay to avoid prison
accounts for risk preferences in utility.
The optimal duration of a bank robbery t∗ is determined by equating the costs and
benefits of staying an additional minute27
− F ′(t∗)[E[Y ′(t∗)]t∗ +D] + [1− F (t∗)]E[Y ′(t∗) + Y ′′(t∗)t∗] = 0. (3)
As we discuss in Section 3, we will model the total haul Y (t) as proportional to t, which
simplifies this expression as Y ′ (t) = y and Y ′′ (t) = 0.
We can then solve the first-order condition for the unobserved disutility of prison D.
The individual-specific compensating variation for each successful robber i is given by:
Di =
1
λi(t∗i )
E[yi]− E[yi]t∗i , (4)
where λ (t∗) ≡ F ′(t∗)
1−F (t∗) is the hazard rate of arrest.
28 What this implies is that if we
can estimate the expected haul and the hazard rate, then we can use these estimates,
combined with the observed robbery duration, to compute the unobserved, individual-
specific disutility of prison.
All the arguments of the disutility of prison D introduce potential heterogeneity in the
observed behaviour of robbers. Robbers may appear to be more reckless (lower D) either
because the marginal utility of wealth is very high (liquidity constrained, low W ), they
have a low valuation of prison time (low d), they use a modus operandi that minimizes
prison time S, or, finally, because they do not care about the future (low δ). While the
relationship in equation (4) identifies the disutility of prison D, the underlying sources of
heterogeneity in preferences are not identified.
27Here and throughout the paper we assume that, conditional on entering the bank, robbers choose an
interior solution, and that the objective function is differentiable.
28The optimal robbery duration t∗ is only observed for those individuals that successfully leave the
bank before the police arrive. For the approximately 4% of robberies for which this is not the case, we
observe only a lower bound for t∗, which one can show equates to an upper bound on D.
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3 Empirical Model
The next step is to devise an empirical strategy to estimate the expected haul and hazard
functions. At least since RAND's 1980 study, Doing Crime: A Survey of California Prison
Inmates, criminals have been shown to have expectations about the costs and benefits
of their actions. Robbers will have expectations about the rate of accumulation of money
and the inherent risk of being caught while inside the bank. These two expectations are
likely to depend on characteristics of the robbery strategy (e.g., using a weapon or wearing
a mask), and characteristics of the target (e.g., presence of a guard, number of security
devices), which will be influenced by the perpetrator's past experiences.
As mentioned in the introduction, we will use objective measures of individual expect-
ations. Prior to entering the bank, robbers will have expectations about the haul and the
likelihood of arrest, based on the chosen modus operandi, characteristics of the target, as
well as their ability. In order to measure these expectations we will estimate the relation-
ship between the haul and hazard of arrest as functions of characteristics of the robbery.
Since ability is unobserved to the researcher, this presents a challenge for estimation. For
example, an individual with a high ability might expect both a larger haul and, at the
same time, a lower hazard of police arrival. This generates a correlation between these
two objects, which left unaccounted for would bias our estimates of disutility. In order to
deal with unobserved heterogeneity in ability, we estimate the expected haul and hazard
of arrest jointly, using a factor model to control for unobserved ability and the correlation
it generates in the outcomes (see e.g., Anderson and Rubin, 1956, Jöreskog and Goldber-
ger, 1975, and Heckman et al., 2006). In what follows we lay out the empirical model,
describing each of the components and our estimation strategy.
3.1 Components
3.1.1 Haul
We model the haul as proportional to the time spent in the bank: Y = y ∗ t, where y
denotes the marginal haul (haul per minute).29 Without observing individual minute-
by-minute money gathering, we cannot directly verify this proportionality assumption.
However, as some supportive evidence, in Figure 1 we plot the raw data on hauls as
a function of time spent in the bank. We also include parametric and non-parametric
regression lines. Circles are proportional to the number of robberies with particular haul
29For robberies involving multiple robbers we first divide the total haul by the number of robbers to
construct Y .
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and duration combinations. The solid line shows a locally polynomial regression of degree
3 with asymptotically optimal constant bandwidth (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). The dashed
line corresponds to a linear regression fit. The non-parametric fit is similar to the linear
fit, suggesting that at least the cross-sectional relationship between the total haul and the
duration of the robbery is approximately linear.30
Furthermore, a linear technology seems consistent with the typical actions taken by
the offenders: i) enter the bank and walk to the teller, which usually takes only a few
seconds unless the offender has to stand in line; ii) ask the teller for the money, typically
the teller's direct cash holdings, which also takes a few seconds; iii) collect and store the
cash, iv) eventually move to the next teller to collect additional cash. Of these actions
the last two are probably the most time consuming, and there is no apparent reason why
robbers should expect convex or concave returns with respect to time, as long as there is
enough cash available.31 We therefore model the (log) haul per minute as a function of
the characteristics of the robbery (xi), unobserved ability (ai), and a residual (ε
y
i ):
ln yi = x
′
iα + piyai + ε
y
i .
As noted above, many, if not all, of the characteristics of a robbery xi are choices made
by the robbers. As a result, they are potentially correlated with the unobserved ability
of the robber, which makes the characteristics endogenous. In order to deal with this, we
decompose ability into two components: a component that is correlated with xi and an
orthogonal residual a˜i ≡ ai − E [ai |xi].32 In essence, a˜i captures the part of ability that
is not reflected in the choice of robbery characteristics. We can then rewrite the haul
function as
ln yi = x
′
iα˜ + piya˜i + ε
y
i , (5)
where α˜ captures the direct effect of robbery characteristics on the haul, as well as indirect
effects via unobserved ability.33 This will be important to consider when interpreting the
coefficients later on. The coefficient on residual ability piy, however, is unchanged.
The expected haul (from the robber's perspective) is based on both observable robbery
characteristics, as well as residual ability a˜. It is possible, however, that expectations
30Both a quadratic and a cubic relationship between haul and duration are rejected in favour of the
linear one (p-value 0.26 and 0.21, regression results are available upon request).
31Since 95% of total hauls are below e55,700, it is also very unlikely that tellers run out of cash.
32See Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984) for related discussions in the context of fixed effects
panel data models.
33We have assumed for simplicity that the expectation of ai conditional on xi is linear (i.e., E [ai |xi] =
ρxi), although this assumption can be relaxed.
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about the haul are updated while the robber is inside the bank, and thus in terms of
equation (5), part (or all) of εyi is known to the robbers when they make their decision of
when to leave the bank. We revisit this in Section 4.5, in which we estimate an alternative
specification of the model that takes this into account.
3.1.2 Hazard of police arrival
Letting Tp denote the random time of police arrival, with pdf f and cdf F , the hazard
function for police arrival at time tp is given by
λ (tp) =
f (tp)
1− F (tp) .
We model police arrival as following an exponential distribution,34 and model the constant
hazard as a function of characteristics and ability as
lnλ (tpi |xi, a˜i) = x′iβ˜ + pipa˜i, (6)
where, as in the model for the haul, we have written the hazard as a function of residual
ability a˜i.
3.1.3 Time spent in the bank / disutility of prison
Recall from equation (4) that we need expectations about the haul and hazard of arrest
in order to compute the disutility of prison. In order to estimate the hazard, we need to
know the arrival time of police for all observations. In the data, however, the observed
duration of the robbery is the minimum of the time of police arrival tp and the (ex-ante)
chosen optimal duration of the robbery t∗. Therefore, we only observe the arrival time of
police for those robbers who had not already left the bank before police arrived. Since
leaving the bank is a decision of the robbers, we also need to take this selection into
account by modelling t∗, which implies that we need a model for the disutility D.
Let T ∗ be a random variable denoting the time at which the robbers would have
optimally chosen to leave the bank. The probability of police arrival at time t, conditional
on not having already arrived, and conditional on the robbers having not yet left the bank
is given by
34In a previous version of the paper, estimates were obtained from a reduced form hazard model using
both an exponential and Cox proportional hazard model. The results were very similar between the two
specifications, and almost indistinguishable where the majority of the mass of durations is distributed.
Therefore, we decided to focus on the exponential model for simplicity.
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Pr (Arrest at time t | not arrested yet, still in bank) = λ (t) 1
Pr (T ∗ > t)
.
Essentially we have a competing risks model, in which no one is censored (every robbery
either ends with police arrival or the robbers leaving the bank). In order to estimate
the hazard of police arrival, we also need to estimate the distribution of optimal robbery
duration T ∗ to compute the probability that the robbery is ongoing: T ∗ > t.
Recall that optimal time spent in the bank T ∗ is given by the solution to the first-order
condition in equation (4). If we solve this equation for time we have
T ∗ =
1
λ (t)
− D
E [y]
. (7)
Note that while the disutility term D is known to the robbers, it is unknown to the eco-
nometrician. Therefore in order to obtain the distribution of T ∗, we need the distribution
of disutility. Similarly to the haul and hazard of police arrival, we allow the disutility of
prison to depend on characteristics and ability:
lnD = x′iδ˜ + pida˜i + ε
d
i . (8)
In particular, ability is likely to affect the disutility of prison through higher ability in-
dividuals having a higher opportunity cost of incarceration. Putting this together with
equation (7) gives us our equation for T ∗:
T ∗i =
1
λ (t∗i |xi, a˜i)
− e
x′iδ˜+pida˜i+ε
d
i
E [yi |xi, a˜i] . (9)
This equation implies that, conditional on xi and a˜i, variation in T ∗ is driven by the
residual in disutility εdi .
3.1.4 Zero hauls and arrest after exiting the bank
Approximately 8% of the robberies in our data yield a haul of zero, and therefore the
log haul is not defined. In order to incorporate the zero haul robberies, we include an
extra equation that models the probability of a non-zero haul as a function of the same
variables (x and a˜). Letting Oi = 1 indicate a strictly positive haul and Oi = 0 indicate
a haul of zero
Pr (Oi = 1 |xi, a˜i) = Φ
(
x′iψ˜ + pioa˜i
)
, (10)
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where Φ denotes a standard normal cdf .
Finally, in addition to observing if and when robbers are arrested during the commis-
sion of the robbery, we also observe an indicator for whether the police make the arrest at
some point after the robbery. While this information is not needed to estimate the model,
the estimates from this equation are interesting on their own (in terms of understanding
how robbery traits are related to ultimate arrest). Furthermore, since ex-post arrest is
also potentially correlated with ability (higher ability robbers might leave fewer and less
informative clues to lead to their capture), adding this to the model provides additional
information to help pin down the unobserved ability of the robbers. Letting Ci = 1 denote
an arrest after exiting the bank (conditional on exiting the bank), we have
Pr (Ci = 1 |xi, a˜i) = Φ (x′iγ˜ + pica˜i) . (11)
3.2 Estimation
In the data we observe one of three mutually exclusive discrete arrest outcomes: 1) caught
in the bank, 2) caught out of the bank, 3) not caught. For those caught in the bank, we
observe a continuous measure of time at which the police arrive. For the other two, we
observe a continuous measure of time spent in the bank. For all of these outcomes we
observe a continuous measure of the haul.
Our model is based on equations (5), (6), (9), (10), and (11).35 We assume that the
residuals in the haul equation and disutility equation, εy and εd, are normally distributed
with mean zero and standard deviations σy and σd that we will estimate. Residual ability
a˜i is assumed to be normally distributed as well. Our factor model setup requires some
normalizations, since unobserved ability has no units. We do this by normalizing the mean
and variance of residual ability to be zero and one, respectively.36 Together these distri-
butional assumptions imply that the marginal haul is log-normally distributed, consistent
with the empirical distribution.
We estimate the model by maximizing the likelihood, which allows us to take into
account the dependence across equations via residual ability a˜i. In essence, correlation
in the unobserved components of the outcomes (haul, arrest, time spent in the bank),
identify the importance of the factor (residual ability) in each outcome. See Appendix A
for a complete characterization of the likelihood.
35In each of these equations, we include both province-level fixed effects and year-by-month fixed effects
to control for unobserved location- and time-specific characteristics.
36Technically we also need to normalize the sign of the coefficient on ability in one of the outcome
equations. We do this by normalizing the effect of ability to be positive in the haul equation.
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4 Results
In Table 3, we report estimates from our model, which we label Statistical Expectations
to reflect that our estimates of the robbers' expectations are based on the statistical
model described above. Recall from Section 3 that our estimates of the coefficients on
observables (such as the use of a firearm, or the presence of guard), combine the direct
effect of the variable, as well as the indirect effect via the correlation with unobserved
ability. We are, however, able to estimate the causal effect of unobserved ability on the
various outcomes via the coefficient on residual ability, a˜.
4.1 Haul
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 present estimates of the coefficients from the model for
the haul in equations (10) and (5), respectively. In column 1, we have estimates of the
probability of obtaining a positive haul, which occurs in 92% of the robberies, and in
column 2 we have estimates of the marginal haul equation.
Robbers who use weapons (either firearms or knives/other) are more likely to have a
positive haul (7 percentage points) and have higher marginal hauls (25% and 14% higher).
Working in groups is also associated with a higher probability of having a positive haul
(4-5 percentage points). The marginal haul is lower per person, which is not surprising
given that they have to split the haul, but the decrease is less than proportional to the
number of robbers, implying a larger overall haul. This decreasing returns to scale in
the number of robbers could be due to specialization among the robbers. For example,
some robbers could be more focused on securing the escape, as opposed to participating
in money gathering. Wearing a mask is associated with a 15% increase in marginal haul,
perhaps because the mask induces fear in the victims, or as a signal of higher ability
robbers.
Robbers who target banks with smaller cash holdings are less likely to receive a positive
haul, as would be expected. Banks with more employees lead to larger marginal hauls,
perhaps because there are more workers to collect the cash for the robbers. The least
profitable robberies are those that happen in the early afternoon, while the most profitable
ones are those that happen around opening and closing time.37 Having more security
devices, security devices with more features, a larger number of invisible security features,
and a security guard are all associated with lower marginal hauls, and to some extent lower
37The probability of a positive haul is lower, but this is offset by a larger marginal haul (although the
latter effect is not statistically significant).
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likelihoods of a positive haul.
Not surprisingly, higher ability generates both a larger probability of a positive haul
as well as larger marginal hauls. Since unobserved ability does not have any units, we
will use the effect of ability on the marginal haul as a benchmark.38 A 1 unit increase in
ability is found to have a 102% increase in marginal haul. Therefore, a 0.98 unit increase
in ability (100
102
) is associated with an 100% increase in marginal haul, and a 0.5 percentage
point increase in the probability of a positive haul.
4.2 Hazard of Police Arrival
Column 3 of Table 3 shows estimates of the hazard function for police arrival in equation
(6). Working in groups is associated with a reduction in the hazard of about 40%, con-
sistent with the specialization story discussed above, in which some of the robbers work
to decrease the probability of apprehension at the expense of a larger per-person haul.
This effect could also be explained by higher ability robbers choosing to work together in
groups, and this higher ability also translating into a smaller hazard. Robbers who wear
masks have lower hazards of 40%, perhaps, as with the haul, because it scares victims or
signals higher ability.
Escaping by foot or car is associated with much larger hazards of police arrival. The
excluded category here is that the means of transportation is not observed, so one likely
explanation for these results is that robbers who manage to conceal their method of
transport are more difficult to detect and/or are higher ability criminals.
The number of employees and size of the bank are also important, as more employees
and larger banks are associated with higher hazards, perhaps because there are more
people available to alert the police. Similarly, the presence of a guard is strongly associated
with police arrival (increased hazard of about 50%). The coefficient on late afternoon
robberies is negative and quite large in magnitude. Since this represents closing time for
most banks in Italy, this suggests that banks are more vulnerable at this time, perhaps
because bank employees (tellers and guards) are either less able or less willing to aid
police near closing time. This may have a compounding effect by attracting higher ability
robbers as well.
Finally, the effect of ability on police arrival is strongly negative, consistent with the
idea that more capable robbers take actions that are less likely to alert the authorities.
Using the effect of ability on the marginal haul as a benchmark, a difference in ability
that corresponds to a doubling of the haul leads to a decrease in the hazard of police
38This is sometimes referred to as anchoring (see Cunha et al., 2010).
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arrival of about 14%.
4.3 Arrest After Exiting the Bank
In column 4, we report estimates from equation (11) related to the probability of sub-
sequent arrest, for those robbers that left the bank before the police arrived.39 Most of the
variables that significantly predict the hazard of police arrival have similarly estimated
effects on subsequent arrest, which is intuitive.
Working as a group leads to a large, roughly 2 percentage point, decrease in the
probability of subsequent arrest. Having the method of transport be unobserved and
wearing a mask also decrease this probability significantly (about 2 percentage points for
each). This makes sense, as these are likely aid significantly in avoiding detection by
police.
Somewhat surprisingly, having more security devices is associated with a decrease in
the probability of subsequent arrest, although the effect is not particularly large. One
additional device lowers the probability by 0.4 percentage points. Examining the effect
of security devices overall, their main role seems to be that of reducing the haul, and not
of increasing the chances of apprehension.
Having more employees increases the likelihood of arrest, again perhaps due to having
more witnesses. The commission of a robbery in the late afternoon perfectly predicts
subsequent arrest: no late afternoon robbers who successfully exited the bank before
police arrival were later apprehended. As discussed in the results for the hazard of police
arrival, this is consistent with bank employees being focused on closing the bank for the
day or more cooperative knowing that they are about to leave, and also with higher ability
robbers targeting this time as a result of these benefits.
Finally, higher ability robbers are also more likely to avoid ex-post arrest. An increase
in ability leading to a doubling of the marginal haul decreases the probability of subsequent
arrest by 0.8 percentage points, a drop of around 25%.
4.4 Time Spent in the Bank / Disutility of Prison
Finally, in column 5 we present estimates of the relationship between robbery charac-
teristics and the disutility of prison from equation (8). Recall that while disutility is
39As discussed earlier, we also estimated a version of the model in which we allowed this probability
of subsequent arrest to depend on the time spent in the bank, under the idea that perhaps robbers who
spent more time left more clues for police. The coefficient on time was very small both economically and
statistically, and including time had almost no effect on the other estimates.
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unobserved, it is related to the observed optimal robbery duration via equation (9). A
positive coefficient indicates a larger disutility of prison (i.e., going to prison is more
costly). We find that higher ability robbers have a higher disutility of prison. High ability
leads to larger hauls and lower probabilities of arrest. These both reflect higher oppor-
tunity costs of spending time in prison, and therefore higher disutilities. A difference in
ability associated with increasing the marginal haul by 100% corresponds to a similar
increase in disutility of 115%.
Robbers with different disutilities target different banks and use different modus op-
erandi. Therefore, a positive (negative) correlation between robbery characteristics and
disutility (as displayed in column 5) is suggestive of these robbery traits being selected
by higher (lower) ability robbers.
There are also direct links between some characteristics and the disutility of prison. In
Italy, there are sanctioning rules requiring that judges adjust sentences proportionally to
the aggravation of the robbery. Specifically, Art. 628 of the penal code sanctions masked
robberies, robberies perpetrated by more than one criminal, and robberies where firearms
are used more strongly than simple" robberies (rapina semplice). This is reflected in
the estimated coefficients for masks and firearms, as disutility is found to be 55% and
50% higher, respectively, although the coefficient for firearms is not precisely estimated.
Using detailed data from sentencing outcomes for bank robberies in Turin, Italy, in the
Online Appendix O2, we find that sentences are at most about 7% and 39% higher for
robberies involving masks and firearms, respectively, suggesting that only part of this
higher disutility is coming from longer sentences. The data from Turin also suggest
that working in groups is associated with slightly longer sentences, although we find no
relationship between disutility and working in pairs and a negative one for groups of
three or more. This suggests that working in groups of three or more is not ideal, as the
reduction in risk is too small to offset the smaller per-capita haul.40
Not surprisingly, travelling to the robbery by foot and targeting a bank with a security
guard are both consistent with lower ability offenders. There is also evidence that higher
ability robbers target banks in the late afternoon around closing time.
40This does not imply that sentencing enhancements based on working in groups are not warranted.
Robberies involving groups of three or more offenders are more harmful, as they are associated with both
larger total hauls and lower probabilities of apprehension.
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4.5 Statistical Expectations and Perfect Foresight
Prior to entering the bank, robbers will have expectations about the haul and the likeli-
hood of arrest, upon which they base their decisions regarding the optimal time to exit the
bank. It is difficult to know whether such expectations are updated during the short time
robbers spend inside the bank. They may get updated as the robbers gather information
inside the bank. For example, the robber might learn that tellers are cooperative, thereby
accelerating the accumulation of money. Alternatively they might learn that cash reserves
are particularly low that day, lowering the expected return.
In line with the literature on expectations we label the two extreme scenarios:
1. statistical expectations, so that robbers who are alike in terms of modus operandi,
target, and ability, are assumed to have the same prior expectations that do not
update while inside the bank branch during the robbery.41
2. perfect foresight, so that the individual expectations are simply the individual real-
izations42
In the first case, no additional information is obtained, and the expectation used to make
the decision of how long to stay in the bank is unchanged from the initial expectation.
This is our baseline specification as described above. In the second case, the expectations
of robbers are updated very quickly. Therefore the expected haul, upon which they base
their decisions, will correspond to the realized one. The truth is likely to lie somewhere
in between, and thus these two cases form bounds on the true underlying expectations
that robbers have about the haul.
Since the perfect foresight expectation of the haul is the observed haul, it captures the
realized uncertainty about the haul. Expected hauls are therefore more dispersed under
perfect foresight. In turn this leads to an increase in the dispersion of the disutilities
implied by the model. In order to see why this is the case, consider a robber that obtains
a larger than anticipated haul. If the robber perfectly internalizes this when deciding how
long to stay in the bank (perfect foresight), this will lead him to want to stay in the bank
longer (see equation (4)). In order for the observed robbery duration to be consistent
with this, it then must be the case that the disutility of prison is larger as well, relative
to the case in which this information is not internalized (statistical expectations). As a
41As an early example of statistical expectations of criminals, Witte (1980) uses post-release experiences
of individuals specializing in a similar crime type to estimate expectations on the potential risks.
42Most aggregate crime regressions assume that criminals have perfect foresight. See Wolpin (1978) for
an early treatise on perfect foresight of criminals.
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result, larger dispersion in expected hauls will translate to larger dispersion in disutilities.
These two frameworks thus also provide bounds on the true underlying disutilities.
Unlike for the haul, there are few signals available to the robbers that could change
risk perceptions over the duration of the robbery. The most important signal is likely to
be the arrival of a police patrol, but by then it is also usually too late to matter. Moreover,
realized risk of apprehension does not change continuously (one is either apprehended or
not), meaning that one cannot use realizations to approximate perceptions. As a result,
we focus on the statistical expectations framework for modelling the hazard of arrest.
Since we have no direct data to inform us as to how much information robbers collect
during the commission of a robbery and therefore how quickly they update their expecta-
tions regarding the haul, we also estimate a version of the model under the bounding case
of perfect foresight expectations about the haul. In the context of our model described
above, this entails replacing the expected haul per minute in equation (4) with the realized
one, and similarly in equation (9).
The estimates from this perfect foresight specification are provided in Table 4. Since
the model equations are all estimated jointly, all of the model parameter estimates are
subject to change. However, as the results in Table 4 illustrate, the parameter estimates
are overall quite similar between the two models. The main difference is in the estimated
dispersion in disutilities, captured by the standard deviation of the residual in the disutil-
ity εdi , which is larger for the perfect foresight model, as expected. The estimated effects
of ability in the various equations are also somewhat greater, although the increase is not
particularly large. Overall the main effect of accounting for the possibility that robbers
accumulate additional information about the haul during the robbery is a more dispersed
distribution of disutilities.
5 Estimating the Individual-Specific Disutility of Prison
Our estimates discussed in the previous section provide us with estimates of the dispersion
in disutility and of the relationship between disutility and robbery characteristics, but not
the actual disutilities themselves. In order to estimate the disutilities, we use equation (4),
plugging in our estimates of the expected haul and the hazard of police arrival, to identify
the unobserved disutilities of prison for each observation.43 Both of these objects depend
on the (residual) ability of the robbers, a˜i, which is unobserved to the econometrician.
43Note that our estimates of the distribution of disutility of prison correspond to the population of
robbers that decided to attempt to rob a bank, and do not necessarily reflect the distribution for the
population at large.
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However, our model estimates can be used to compute an expected (residual) ability level
for each observation, which can then be plugged into the expectations formulas.44
We begin by showing results comparing our estimates of the expected marginal haul
(from the perspective of the robbers) for our bounding cases of statistical expectations
and perfect foresight. For the statistical expectations model, this involves calculating
the expected haul conditional on observed robbery characteristics and ability. Under the
perfect foresight model, the expected haul equals the realized haul. We illustrate the
estimates graphically in Figure 2 by plotting a line connecting the origin and the total
expected haul, where the slope of each ray represents an expected marginal haul. The
figure highlights that the variation in slopes for the perfect foresight model is noticeably
larger compared to the statistical expectations model. This is expected, as the perfect
foresight model incorporates uncertainty that the statistical expectations model does not.
Next we compute the hazard of police arrival. We use this, combined with the expected
haul, to compute the disutility for each observation using equation (4). Recall that the
equation for disutility depends on the optimal time spent in the bank t∗. For a fraction
(about 4%) of our observations, the police arrive before the robbers leave the bank,
implying that we observe a lower bound on t∗. As a result, the estimated disutilities
for these observations represent an upper bound on disutility.
The total disutility of prison depends on the number of years robbers expect to spend in
prison if arrested, and the rate at which they discount these future punishments. In Italy
there are no official national statistics on prison time served by convicted bank robbers
that condition on the modus operandi. Therefore, in order to translate our disutility
estimates into a yearly disutility of prison (denoted d), we hand-collected detailed data
on sentences for all bank robbers sentenced in the Piedmont region of Italy during the
period of 2005-2007. These data cover 96 robbers, who participated in 324 bank robberies
between 1993 and 2007. Unfortunately these data do not include information about the
targeted branches, and therefore we cannot link them to the robberies in our main data.
However, we can use these data to determine (to some extent) how sentence length varies
with the characteristics of the robbery.45 The average sentence length is 3.5 years,46 and
increases by 30% to 40% when robbers use firearms, by 10% to 20% when they operate
in a group, and by 3% to 7% when they use a mask.
44This involves applying Bayes' Rule to recover the distribution of (residual) ability conditional on the
data, and then integrating over that distribution to compute the expected value of ability.
45See Online Appendix O2 for details of this auxiliary data and how we calculated the expected sentence
length conditional on robbery characteristics.
46This number is not far from the average sentence length of robbers convicted in Milan (Mastrobuoni,
2014).
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There is very little empirical evidence in the literature on the extent to which criminal
offenders discount the future. In general, if robbers discount future disutility with an
annual discount factor of δ, then the relationship between the total disutility D and the
yearly value d is given by D =
∑S−1
t=0 δ
td = d1−δ
S
1−δ , where S is the expected sentence
length. The only paper we are aware of that provides a direct empirical estimate of
criminal discounting is Mastrobuoni and Rivers (2016), which finds an average annual
discount factor of 0.74 among criminal offenders in Italy.
5.1 The Total and the Yearly Disutility of Prison
Figure 3 shows the distribution of total disutility of prison (capped at e2,000,000) under
each model. There is a mass of observations with zero disutility under the perfect foresight
model corresponding to observations with zero hauls. For the statistical expectations
model, the expected haul is always strictly positive, and thus so are the disutilities. In
both cases, the estimated distribution of compensating variation (or disutility of prison
time) is positively skewed and resembles a log-normal earnings distribution.
We also compute the implied yearly measures d using an annual discount factor of
0.7 to correspond to the estimates in Mastrobuoni and Rivers (2016), as well as with a
discount factor of 1 for ease of interpretation.47 These values are plotted in Figure 4.
Table 5 shows the percentiles of these distributions. The median yearly value is
between e67,000 and e130,000, depending on which model and discount factor are used.
This is consistent with what robbers can potentially earn in a year robbing banks.48
In line with the evidence shown in Figure 2, and consistent with what one would expect,
the estimated disutilities that are based on the perfect foresight assumption lead to more
dispersion in total disutilities compared to those found under statistical expectations.
Moreover, the mass of robbers with zero realized hauls generates a mass of zero disutilities
for the perfect foresight model. Despite these differences, the correlation between the two
disutilities is 93%, and the two models imply similar information about the perceived cost
of imprisonment.
47See also Nagin and Pogarsky (2004); Jolliffe and Farrington (2009); Åkerlund et al. (2016); Mancino
et al. (2016) for studies relating criminal behaviour to measures of future time preference elicited from
survey questions.
48The median haul per robber is e5,300. Data collected from the Milan police (Mastrobuoni, 2017),
in which serial bank robbers are tracked over time, show that the median number of days between
bank robberies is 10. Given that the overall arrest rate is 6.6%, the expected number of robberies in a
year is approximately 14. For a robber with the median frequency of robberies and the median haul,
the anticipated yearly haul is close to e75,000, which is in line with the annual value of compensating
variation that we find.
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5.2 Deterrence
Given our estimates of disutility, we can ask the question, by how much would policy
makers need to increase the disutility of prison in order to push the optimal robbery
duration to zero. Using our estimates of the expected haul and hazard of police arrival,
we calculate this for each observation by computing the value of the disutility D such
that t∗ = 0 in equation (4). Letting this value be denoted as Dt=0, and letting Dt=t∗ be
the estimated value corresponding to the observed duration, we have that the percentage
increase in disutility needed for robbers with an observed t∗ > 0 to drive the duration to
0 is given by logDt=0− logDt=t∗ . We then compute the associated percentage increase in
sentence length needed to drive t∗ to 0 for different values of the discount factor. (Note
that for a discount factor of 1, the necessary percentage increase in disutility and sentence
length are equivalent.)
Table 6 reports the percentage increase that drives different fractions of the robberies
to zero durations. For example, for a discount factor of 0.7, for the statistical expectations
model, the number in the first column shows that in order to drive 5% of the sample to a
duration of zero one needs a 1% increase in sentence length. In order to do this for 25%
of bank robberies, the penalties would have to increase by about 2%, etc.
Overall, and no matter how one models the expectations, criminal behaviour is pre-
dicted to be highly responsive to changes in the sanctioning system. Moreover, since
sentence lengths for bank robbers are quite low in Italy, these percentage increases in
sentence length would come at a relatively low cost to society. If we were to interpret
a robbery duration of t∗ = 0 to be no robbery, then this implies substantial deterrent
power from increasing sanctions. However, this calculation only takes into account the
intensive margin decision of how long to stay in the bank, conditional on having entered
the bank. If there is a fixed component of utility related to robbing banks, for example
due to the rush of planning and executing a robbery, then further increases in sentence
length would be necessary to deter these robberies.
Our main focus in this paper relates to the intensive margin decision of robbers of
how long to stay in the bank. As a result, in the maximization problem described in
equation (2) we only included components that varied with robbery duration t. If we let
FRi denote the fixed return to committing a robbery and account for arrests made after
exiting the bank (Ci = 1), a more general maximization problem can be written as:
max
ti
FRi+[1− F (ti)] [1− Pr (Ci = 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of No Arrest
E[yi]ti− [F (ti) + (1− F (ti)) Pr (Ci = 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prob. of Arrest
Di. (12)
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This equation generates the same solution for the optimal duration as the one to our
original equation (2).
The total return to a robbery in equation (12) is then the sum of the fixed return FRi
and the remaining variable return which varies with duration. Given the observed robbery
duration and our estimates of the expected haul and probability of arrest (both inside the
bank and after exiting the bank), as well as the disutility associated with imprisonment, we
can compute the expected variable return to a robbery (EV Ri).49 Under the assumption
that the total expected return should be greater than zero: FRi + EV Ri ≥ 0, we can
compute a lower bound on FRi for each observation that is equal to −EV Ri. These
values are plotted in Figure 5. The average value is e12,782, which is about 150% of
the average haul for a robbery (per robber). This suggests that even greater increases in
sanctions are necessary to deter these individuals from committing robberies.
In an attempt to interpret this additional reward, we note that bank robbery (and
more generally robbery) differs from most other crimes in that there is both a violent and
financial gain component. While financially motivated crimes can be explained in part
by the monetary rewards, less is known in the literature as to what drives individuals to
commit violent offences. Our dataset on bank robberies thus provides us with a unique
opportunity to quantify (in monetary terms) the value of the violent component of crime.
One interpretation of the fixed component of crime described above, is that it captures the
rush that offenders receive from committing a violent act. The fact that we can measure
the monetary rewards to crime allows us to quantify this rush (in our case a lower bound),
which is the approximately e12,000 discussed above.
5.3 Heterogeneity
The estimates in Tables 3 and 4 identify the robbery characteristics that are most strongly
associated with differences in hauls and apprehension rates. For hauls, the use of a weapon
and/or a mask leads to larger hauls, as does targeting banks with fewer security devices
and no guards. Regarding arrests, working in groups, wearing a mask, and targeting banks
with no security guard and few employees are associated with a decreased likelihood of
getting caught.
Our estimates suggest that judges and lawmakers may want to target these robbery
characteristics (in terms of sentence enhancements) in order to reduce the harm created
49Since the expectations here are from the perspective of the robber before entering the bank, we use
the estimates corresponding to our baseline model of statistical expectations that do not incorporate
information obtained during the robbery.
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by bank robberies. There is evidence that this is already occurring in Italy and elsewhere,
for example in US state and federal legislation, particularly for crimes involving firearms,
groups of offenders, and masks. One caveat to this is that our estimates reflect both the
causal effects of these characteristics as well as the indirect effects of the ability of those
individuals who select them. Robbers (particularly high ability ones) may respond to
an increase in the penalty for certain robber characteristics by simply selecting different
ones, as opposed to not committing a robbery, partially mitigating the deterrent effect.
Ideally, one would like to target the high ability offenders directly, since these robbers
cause the most damage (more money lost and more repeat offences). This is challenging
though because ability is unobserved. One additional benefit of our estimates is that
they suggest that a broader policy instrument could have a similarly targeted impact.
We find that higher ability offenders, in addition to having improved outcomes, have a
larger disutility of prison, possibly due to a higher opportunity cost of imprisonment. As
a result, they are likely to be more sensitive to increases in sentence length. By increasing
sentences overall, an important implication is that high ability offenders are indirectly
and disproportionately targeted.50
6 Conclusions
Using unique and detailed data on almost 5,000 Italian bank robberies, we estimate how
the haul and likelihood of arrest vary with characteristics of each robbery, including the
unobserved ability of the robbers. Using information on the observed robbery duration we
estimate individual-specific values of the compensating variation of imprisonment. We find
evidence of large differences across offenders. Our estimates provide strong evidence that
unobserved ability of robbers leads to systematically better outcomes for these offenders:
larger hauls and lower arrest probabilities. We also find that higher ability offenders have
a larger disutility of prison, potentially due to the opportunity cost of being incarcerated.
Policy makers and law enforcement have several instruments through which they can
attempt to reduce crime. Our results indicate substantial heterogeneity in the disutility of
prison (see Table 5 and Figures 3 and 4). This suggests that different policies are needed
to effectively target individuals at different points in the distribution of disutility. Our
finding that the disutility of prison is positively related to ability (which leads to larger
50Durlauf et al. (2010) describe a similar, but oppositely signed, effect in the context of the deterrent
effect of the death penalty. They show that when there is heterogeneity in preferences for punishment
(in their case the death penalty), then those individuals most likely to be deterred are the least likely to
commit a crime in the first place, dampening the deterrent effect.
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hauls and lower apprehension probabilities) implies that increased sentence lengths dis-
proportionately target higher ability offenders.51 However, for individuals with relatively
low valuations of prison, increasing sentences or the probability of apprehension is likely
to have much smaller effects on behaviour. For these individuals, policies which serve to
increase the opportunity costs of crime could be more effective, and provide an alternative
to increases in policing or sentencing.
Overall, our results highlight the benefit of collecting and analysing data at the indi-
vidual level for crime research (Witte, 1980). By having data on individual offences, we
are able to not only identify the presence of heterogeneity in the perceived cost of im-
prisonment, but we can measure the relationship with the underlying, unobserved ability
of the offenders, and use this information to inform the design of criminal policy. In the
future, researchers can use the method outlined in this paper to study other illegal acts
that also involve intensive margin decisions.
Appendix A: Likelihood Function
Observations in our data can be placed into one of three mutually exclusive, discrete
outcomes: 1) caught in the bank, 2) caught out of the bank, 3) not caught. For the
outcome caught in the bank, we observe a continuous measure of time at which the police
arrive. For the other two, we observe a continuous measure of time spent in the bank.
For all of these outcomes we observe a continuous measure of the haul.
Letting θ denote the vector of parameters to be estimated, we can write the likelihood
as the sum across the likelihood of the three discrete outcomes. The likelihood for the first
outcome, conditional on the observed data, is denoted as L (θ; y, tp, 1 |x), and is equal to
the probability of observing a marginal haul equal to y, a time at which the police arrive
of tp, and the probability of the police arriving before the robbers leave the bank. With
a slight abuse of notation, let g denote a generic density function. Let Φk and φk, for
k ∈ {ln a˜, lnT ∗, ln y,O,C}, denote a cdf and pdf of a normal random variable, and let
Exp and exp denote the cdf and pdf of the exponential distribution.52 The likelihood for
51It is worth noting that in the US, where sanctions are significantly more severe, bank robberies are
believed to be mostly the work of amateurs (Weisel, 2007; Department of Justice, 2003).
52We assume that the residual in the disutility equation is log-normally distributed, which implies that
T ∗ is also log-normally distributed (conditional on a˜ and x).
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case 1) is then given by the following
L (θ; y, tp, 1 |x) = g (y, tp, T ∗ > tp |x; θ)
=
∫
g (y, tp, T
∗ > tp |x, a˜; θ)φln a˜ (ln a˜; θ) da˜
=
∫
[1− ΦlnT ∗ (ln tp | y, tp, x, a˜; θ)] g (y, tp |x, a˜; θ)φln a˜ (ln a˜; θ) da˜
=
∫
[1− ΦlnT ∗ (ln tp | y, tp, x, a˜; θ)] g (y |x, a˜; θ) exp (tp |x, a˜; θ)φln a˜ (ln a˜; θ) da˜
=
∫
[1− ΦlnT ∗ (ln tp | y, tp, x, a˜; θ)]
× [Φo (x, a˜; θ)φln y (ln y |x, a˜; θ)]O [1− Φo (x, a˜; θ)]1−O
×exp (tp |x, a˜; θ)φln a˜ (ln a˜; θ) da˜.
The second equality follows from the definition of a conditional density function and allows
us to to express the likelihood as the integral over the unobserved residual ability a˜. The
third equality follows from the definition of a conditional density function and the fact
that the haul per minute and the arrival time of police do not depend on the residual in
the disutility of prison, which is the residual in T ∗. The fourth equality follows from the
fact that conditional on the observed data x and residual ability a˜, the haul per minute
and police arrival time are independent. The fifth equality accounts for zero hauls, where
recall that O = 1 denotes a strictly positive haul, and O = 0 otherwise.
For cases 2) and 3) robbers were not arrested inside the bank, and what distinguishes
them from each other is whether or not an arrest was made outside of the bank, conditional
on successfully leaving the bank. The corresponding likelihoods are given by:
L (θ; y, t∗, 2 |x) = g (y, t∗, Tp > t∗, C = 1 |x; θ)
=
∫
g (y, t∗, Tp > t∗, C = 1 |x, a˜; θ)φln a˜ (ln a˜; θ) da˜
=
∫ [
1− ExpTp (t∗ | y, t∗, x, a˜; θ)
]
g (y, t∗, C = 1 |x, a˜; θ)φln a˜ (ln a˜; θ) da˜
=
∫ [
1− ExpTp (t∗ | y, t∗, x, a˜; θ)
]
g (y |x, a˜; θ)
×φlnT ∗ (ln t∗ |x, a˜; θ) ΦC (x, a˜; θ) lnφa˜ (a˜; θ) da˜
=
∫ [
1− ExpTp (t∗ | y, t∗, x, a˜; θ)
]
× [Φo (x, a˜; θ)φln y (ln y |x, a˜; θ)]O [1− Φo (x, a˜; θ)]1−O
×φlnT ∗ (ln t∗ |x, a˜; θ) ΦC (x, a˜; θ)φln a˜ (ln a˜; θ) da˜
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and
L (θ; y, t∗, 3 |x) = g (y, t∗, Tp > t∗, C = 0 |x; θ)
=
∫
g (y, t∗, Tp > t∗, C = 0 |x, a˜; θ)φln a˜ (ln a˜; θ) da˜
=
∫ [
1− ExpTp (t∗ | y, t∗, x, a˜; θ)
]
g (y, t∗, C = 0 |x, a˜; θ)φln a˜ (ln a˜; θ) da˜
=
∫ [
1− ExpTp (t∗ | y, t∗, x, a˜; θ)
]
g (y |x, a˜; θ)
×φlnT ∗ (ln t∗ |x, a˜; θ) [1− ΦC (x, a˜; θ)]φln a˜ (ln a˜; θ) da˜
=
∫ [
1− ExpTp (t∗ | y, t∗, x, a˜; θ)
]
× [Φo (x, a˜; θ)φln y (ln y |x, a˜; θ)]O [1− Φo (x, a˜; θ)]1−O
×φlnT ∗ (ln t∗ |x, a˜; θ) [1− ΦC (x, a˜; θ)]φln a˜ (ln a˜; θ) da˜,
where in both cases the fourth equality uses the fact that conditional on the observed
data x and residual ability a˜, the haul per minute, police arrival time, and the probability
of ex-post arrest are independent.
The model parameters consist of coefficients on observables x:
(
α˜, β˜, δ˜, ψ˜, γ˜
)
, coef-
ficients on ability (piy, pip, pid, pio, pic), and the standard deviations of the residuals in the
marginal haul and disutility equations (σy, σd). We integrate out the residual ability using
Gauss-Hermite quadrature, and estimate the parameters via maximum likelihood.
Appendix B: Second-Order Approximation to Utility
In this appendix we show that under a few additional assumptions, we can derive a similar
version of the utility maximization problem in equation (1) and associated willingness-to-
pay to avoid prison in equation (4) in the main body, for a second-order approximation
to the utility function.
There is a long history of second-order Taylor approximations of expected utility func-
tions in economics and in finance. Among the best-known result of such approximations
is the mean-variance decision in portfolio theory, which has been shown to fare quite well
when compared to direct utility maximization (see, among others, Levy, 1974; Levy and
Markowitz, 1979; Kroll et al., 1984). Moreover, the approximation performs well even
when using an empirical distribution of payoffs that are different from the Normal one
(see Tsiang, 1972), or when the utility functions are not quadratic functions, for example,
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power functions (CRRA) or inverse exponential functions (see Tsiang, 1972; Hlawitschka,
1994).53
The second-order approximation to the expected utility (around t = 0) associated
with staying in the bank for t minutes is
E[U (W + Y (t) , δ)] ≈ U (W, δ) + ∂U (W, δ)
∂W
E [y] t+
1
2
∂2U (W, δ)
∂W 2
E
[
y2
]
t2,
where recall that we have modelled the total haul as Y (t) = yt. Under the assumption
of power utility, a commonly used utility function with an implied constant relative risk
aversion of r, the right-hand side can be rewritten as:
EU (W, δ) +
∂U (W, δ)
∂W
E [y] t+
1
2
∂U (W, δ)
∂W
(−r
W
)
E
[
y2
]
t2.
If we also assume that (unobserved) individual wealth is proportional to the expected
total haul (with proportionality factor k
2
),54 divide this expression by the marginal utility
of wealth, and replace for E[U (W + Y (t) , δ)] in the utility maximization problem in
equation (1), we obtain
max
t
V (t) = [1− F (t)]
[
U (W, δ)
∂W
∂U (W, δ)
+ E [y] t− r
k
E [y2] t2
E (y) t
]
+F (t) U˜
(
W, {c (j)}j≤S , S, δ
) ∂W
∂U (W, δ)
.
Letting CV denote the coefficient of variation, where CV =
E(y2)−E(y)2
E(y)2
, and recalling the
definition of D =
[
U (W, δ)− U˜ (W,d, S, δ)
]
∂W
∂U(W,δ)
, this can be rewritten as
max
t
V (t) = [1− F (t)]E [y] t
[
1− r
k
(
CV 2 + 1
)]
+ F (t)D.
Finally, dividing through by
(
1− r
k
(CV 2 + 1)
)
, which does not depend on t, gives us
max
t
V (t) = [1− F (t)]E [y] t+ F (t) D˘,
53Moreover, Hlawitschka (1994) shows that second-order Taylor approximations work well even when
Taylor expansions diverge.
54This assumption is not directly testable without data on the wealth holdings of bank robbers. How-
ever, since bank robbers tend to be recurrent offenders with large and predictable criminal hauls, we
believe it is reasonable to assume that their wealth is proportional to the expected haul.
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where D˘ ≡ D
(1− rk (CV 2+1))
. This expression is equivalent to that in equation (1), except D˘
replaces D. In both cases, the D term captures the willingness to pay to avoid prison.
In this case D˘, adjusts for risk preferences in the utility function via r. In other words,
the more risk averse (loving) the individual, the more (less) they are willing to pay to
avoid a given level of disutility associated with going to prison.
Collegio Carlo Alberto, University of Essex, and IZA
University of Western Ontario
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Figure 1: Haul and Time Spent Inside the Bank
Notes: The y-axis shows the haul (in e1,000s) and the x-axis shows the duration of the
robbery. Circles (proportional to their frequency) show the raw data and are truncated
at 60,000e (97th percentile). The non-parametric fit is based on a locally polynomial
regression of degree 3 with asymptotically optimal constant bandwidth (Fan and
Gijbels, 1996).
38
Figure 2: Predicted Hauls and Marginal Hauls
Notes: The figure on the right shows the actual realizations of the hauls (the endpoints, Y ) connected
with the origin (the perfect foresight hypothesis). The slopes of these lines are the predicted marginal
hauls, Y/t. The figure on the left shows the same for the expected hauls under the statistical
expectations model.
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Figure 3: The Distribution of the Total Disutility of Prison
Notes: The top two figures show the distribution (capped at e2,000,000) of the total disutility of
prison (in e1,000s) for the statistical expectations and perfect foresight models. The bottom two
figures exclude observations with zero hauls.
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Figure 4: The Distribution of the Yearly Disutility of Prison
Notes: The top two figures show the distribution (capped at e800,000) of the yearly disutility of
prison (in e1,000s) for the statistical expectations and perfect foresight models. The yearly figures
are computed for a predicted sentence length based on the regression shown in column 2 of Table
9, for a discount factor of 1.0. The bottom two figures use a discount factor of 0.7.
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Figure 5: The Distribution of the Lower Bound of the Fixed Return to Robbery
Notes: This figure plots the distribution of the implied lower bound on the fixed return to
committing a bank robbery.
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Table 1: Life Table of Bank Robberies
Time Number surviving Arrested Successful Total
to time t− 1 between t− 1 and t
1 4969 20 272 292
2 4677 71 1041 1112
3 3565 101 1597 1698
4 1867 31 485 516
5 1351 51 698 749
6 602 2 73 75
7 527 5 49 54
8 473 1 51 52
9 421 0 12 12
10 409 20 165 185
11 224 0 4 4
12 220 0 9 9
13 211 2 8 10
14 201 0 3 3
15 198 5 44 49
16 149 1 4 5
17 144 1 2 3
18 141 5 0 5
19 136 0 3 3
20 133 9 48 57
22 76 0 1 1
23 75 0 3 3
25 72 0 28 28
27 44 0 1 1
30 43 3 40 43
Notes: This table shows the distribution of successful and unsuccessful
bank robberies that last at most half an hour.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean SD
Arrested 0.066 0.25
Duration of the robbery (in minutes) 4.27 4.17
Total haul 16,009 29,711
Haul per robber 8,732 13,653
Firearms 0.15 0.36
Knife or makeshift weapon 0.70 0.46
Two robbers 0.52 0.50
Three or more robbers 0.15 0.36
Masked robbers 0.43 0.49
Traveling on foot 0.34 0.48
Traveling by car 0.20 0.40
Traveling by motorbike 0.07 0.25
Isolated branch 0.25 0.43
Bank with little cash 0.63 0.48
Bank with less than 5 employees 0.52 0.50
Number of security devices (SD) 5.61 1.18
Average number of characteristics 1.26 0.38
% of invisible devices 0.67 0.16
Guarded 0.08 0.27
Number of employees present 4.80 2.96
Number of customers present 2.81 3.84
Number of customers unknown 0.10 0.31
Before 8am 0.04 0.19
Between 12pm and 3pm 0.31 0.46
Between 3pm and 4pm 0.04 0.20
Monday 0.20 0.40
Tuesday 0.18 0.39
Wednesday 0.18 0.39
Thursday 0.19 0.39
Friday 0.24 0.43
N. obs. 4,969
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics for the sample of
bank robberies that last at most 30 minutes. About 96% of all
robberies last at most 30 minutes.
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Table 3: Statistical Expectations Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Positive Haul (Log) Haul Per Minute Hazard of Police Arrival Caught After Exit Disutility of Prison
Firearms 0.46*** 0.25*** -0.19 -0.17 0.53
(0.10) (0.07) (0.31) (0.15) (0.34)
Knife or makeshift weapon 0.50*** 0.14** 0.42* -0.10 -0.20
(0.07) (0.06) (0.23) (0.11) (0.25)
Two robbers 0.30*** -0.57*** -0.45*** -0.27*** -0.06
(0.06) (0.04) (0.14) (0.09) (0.15)
Three or more robbers 0.36*** -0.86*** -0.35* -0.36** -0.46**
(0.10) (0.06) (0.20) (0.15) (0.22)
Masked robbers 0.06 0.15*** -0.38*** -0.36*** 0.55***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.14) (0.10) (0.15)
Traveling on foot -0.02 -0.08* 0.51*** 0.22** -0.62***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.16) (0.11) (0.18)
Traveling by car -0.05 0.11** 0.37** 0.40*** -0.29
(0.08) (0.05) (0.17) (0.12) (0.19)
Traveling by motorbike 0.02 -0.12 -0.40 0.47*** 0.29
(0.12) (0.09) (0.43) (0.17) (0.45)
Isolated branch 0.03 0.03 -0.14 0.07 0.19
(0.07) (0.04) (0.16) (0.10) (0.17)
Bank with little cash -0.16*** -0.04 0.08 0.07 -0.14
(0.06) (0.04) (0.13) (0.09) (0.15)
Bank with less than 5 employees 0.10* -0.27*** -0.40*** 0.02 0.16
(0.06) (0.05) (0.14) (0.09) (0.16)
Number of security devices (SD) 0.00 -0.04** -0.04 -0.10*** 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Average number of characteristics per SD -0.23*** -0.26*** -0.06 0.07 -0.23
(0.08) (0.06) (0.16) (0.10) (0.18)
% of invisible devices -0.37** -0.67*** -0.22 -0.31 -0.50
(0.19) (0.12) (0.40) (0.24) (0.43)
Guarded -0.13 -0.21*** 0.50** -0.28 -0.76***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.20) (0.21) (0.23)
Number of employees present -0.01 0.03*** 0.04** 0.03** -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Number of customers present 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Number of customers unknown -0.25** 0.05 -0.13 0.22 0.14
(0.10) (0.07) (0.24) (0.14) (0.26)
Before 8am -0.63*** 0.08 -0.43 0.14 0.37
(0.12) (0.11) (0.34) (0.23) (0.38)
Between 12pm and 3pm -0.11* -0.12*** -0.26* -0.01 0.13
(0.06) (0.04) (0.14) (0.09) (0.15)
Between 3pm and 4pm† -0.60*** 0.13 -1.70**  1.73***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.81) (0.52)
Monday 0.05 0.17*** -0.02 0.15 0.20
(0.08) (0.06) (0.20) (0.12) (0.22)
Tuesday 0.07 0.08 -0.05 -0.11 0.15
(0.09) (0.06) (0.19) (0.13) (0.22)
Wednesday -0.01 -0.02 0.33* -0.02 -0.36*
(0.09) (0.06) (0.19) (0.13) (0.21)
Thursday -0.03 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.06
(0.08) (0.06) (0.18) (0.12) (0.20)
Ability 0.04** 1.02*** -0.14* -0.14*** 1.17***
(0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10)
Constant 1.49*** 8.77*** -4.61*** -1.67*** 2.40***
(0.33) (0.19) (0.65) (0.63) (0.71)
Standard Deviation of Error  0.75***   0.59***
(0.08) (0.03)
Province fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4969 4969 4969 4969 4969
Notes: † This variable perfectly predicts arrest after exiting the bank. (No arrests were made after
robbers exited the bank for robberies that took place between 3pm and 4pm.) Standard errors are
reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Perfect Foresight Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Positive Haul (Log) Haul Per Minute Hazard of Police Arrival Caught After Exit Disutility of Prison
Firearms 0.46*** 0.25*** -0.17 -0.14 0.40
(0.10) (0.08) (0.37) (0.15) (0.42)
Knife or makeshift weapon 0.50*** 0.14** 0.50* -0.10 -0.44
(0.07) (0.06) (0.26) (0.11) (0.29)
Two robbers 0.30*** -0.57*** -0.47*** -0.26*** -0.06
(0.06) (0.04) (0.16) (0.09) (0.18)
Three or more robbers 0.36*** -0.86*** -0.33 -0.33** -0.55**
(0.09) (0.06) (0.22) (0.15) (0.27)
Masked robbers 0.06 0.15*** -0.44*** -0.34*** 0.63***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.16) (0.10) (0.19)
Traveling on foot -0.02 -0.08* 0.55*** 0.21** -0.71***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.18) (0.10) (0.21)
Traveling by car -0.05 0.11** 0.39* 0.40*** -0.38
(0.08) (0.05) (0.20) (0.12) (0.24)
Traveling by motorbike 0.02 -0.12 -0.45 0.49*** 0.33
(0.12) (0.09) (0.46) (0.17) (0.49)
Isolated branch 0.03 0.03 -0.16 0.07 0.21
(0.07) (0.05) (0.18) (0.09) (0.21)
Bank with little cash -0.16*** -0.04 0.12 0.07 -0.18
(0.06) (0.04) (0.16) (0.09) (0.18)
Bank with less than 5 employees 0.10* -0.27*** -0.40** 0.02 0.17
(0.06) (0.05) (0.16) (0.09) (0.19)
Number of security devices (SD) 0.00 -0.04** -0.06 -0.10*** 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
Average number of characteristics per SD -0.23*** -0.26*** -0.03 0.07 -0.19
(0.08) (0.06) (0.19) (0.10) (0.21)
% of invisible devices -0.37** -0.67*** -0.15 -0.34 -0.67
(0.19) (0.12) (0.46) (0.25) (0.51)
Guarded -0.13 -0.21*** 0.57** -0.28 -0.84***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.23) (0.21) (0.28)
Number of employees present -0.01 0.03*** 0.05** 0.03** -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of customers present 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Number of customers unknown -0.25** 0.05 -0.12 0.26* 0.16
(0.10) (0.07) (0.28) (0.14) (0.31)
Before 8am -0.63*** 0.08 -0.32 0.10 0.41
(0.12) (0.11) (0.40) (0.23) (0.47)
Between 12pm and 3pm -0.11* -0.12*** -0.23 -0.04 0.11
(0.06) (0.04) (0.16) (0.09) (0.20)
Between 3pm and 4pm† -0.60*** 0.13 -1.75*  1.98***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.94) (0.57)
Monday 0.05 0.17*** -0.05 0.15 0.22
(0.08) (0.06) (0.22) (0.12) (0.25)
Tuesday 0.07 0.08 -0.04 -0.12 0.12
(0.09) (0.06) (0.23) (0.14) (0.26)
Wednesday -0.01 -0.02 0.35 -0.03 -0.41
(0.08) (0.06) (0.22) (0.13) (0.26)
Thursday -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.04
(0.08) (0.06) (0.21) (0.12) (0.24)
Ability 0.08** 1.18*** -0.20** -0.13*** 1.42***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11)
Constant 1.49*** 8.77*** -4.68*** -1.60** -1.56
(0.33) (0.19) (0.82) (0.70) (0.96)
Standard Deviation of Error  0.46***   6.52***
(0.02) (0.18)
Province fixed effects (FE) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year×Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4969 4969 4969 4969 4969
Notes: † This variable perfectly predicts arrest after exiting the bank. (No arrests were made after
robbers exited the bank for robberies that took place between 3pm and 4pm.) Standard errors are
reported in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Percentage Change in Expected Sentence Corresponding to t∗ = 0
Percentage of robberies 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Statistical expectations, δ = 1 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07
Statistical expectations, δ = 0.7 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.13
Statistical expectations, δ = 0.5 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.26
Statistical expectations, δ = 0.3 0.05 0.11 0.20 0.35 0.94
Perfect foresight, δ = 1 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.11
Perfect foresight, δ = 0.7 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.19
Perfect foresight, δ = 0.5 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.38
Perfect foresight, δ = 0.3 0.05 0.14 0.25 0.47 1.39
Notes: This table shows the percentage change in the expected sentence needed to drive the
duration of x% of robberies to 0. Note that for a discount factor of 1, this number is the
same as the percentage increase in total disutility required.
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Online Appendix
O1: Comparison of Italy, Europe, and the US
According to the Uniform Crime Statistics, each year in the US there are around 10,000
bank robberies, representing more than 10% of all commercial robberies, with an average
haul of 4,000 dollars (Weisel, 2007). Relative to its size, Italy faces a far greater prob-
lem. Each year there are more bank robberies in Italy than in the rest of Europe put
togetherapproximately 3,000. Data from the European Banking Federation (covering
Europe and a few other countries) reveal that Italy is followed by Canada and Germany,
which have around 800 robberies per year, then by France with around 600 (Table 7).
The US has more than 5 times the population of Italy but just 3 times as many bank
robberies (Weisel, 2007).
Low probabilities of apprehension, large cash holdings, but also mild sentencing and
the banks' fears that more stringent security devices would lead to a loss of clients, are
believed to be the main drivers of Italy's high number of bank robberies. Furthermore,
the trend over time is not wholly encouraging. Figure 6 shows the average haul (right
axis) and the number of bank robberies (left axis) between 1990 and 2006. While the
average haul went down, the number of bank robberies went from fewer than 1,500 in
1990 to double that number less than 10 years later.
Perceived costs of robbing banks depend on the probability of apprehension and on
the expected sanctions. More than 90% of Italian bank robberies end up without an
arrest, while in the US 33% of bank robbers are arrested on the same day they commit
the robbery. Moreover, US federal guidelines impose sentences of up to 20 years (25 years
when a weapon is used), while in Italy the sentence lengths range between 3 and 10 years
depending on the severity of the crime. The range becomes 4.5 to 20 years when at least
one of the following conditions is satisfied (Art. 628 of the penal code): a weapon is used,
the robber uses a disguise, he works in a group, violence is used to incapacitate a victim,
or the robber belongs to an organized crime association.
The expected costs of robbing a bank (to the robber) are, therefore, noticeably lower
in Italy than in the US. What about the expected costs to society? The average haul is
almost e20,000 (in the US it is equivalent to approximately e6,000). This leads to a direct
cost on the order of e50 million a year. But the indirect cost is even larger. A survey of
21,000 retail bank branches, representing 65% of all Italian branches, shows that in 2006
banks spent an average of e10,700 per branch to prevent bank robberies (a total of more
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than e300 million) according to OSSIF (2006). Each branch spent an additional e4,900 to
prevent thefts and e6,300 to protect financial couriers. Therefore, the total amount spent
by banks in 2006 to prevent thefts and robberies was more than e700 million. This might,
in part, explain why Italian banks charge on average the largest account management fees
in Europe: e90 against a European average of just e14 (European Commission, 2007).
Moreover, Miller-Burke et al. (1999) show that in the US most employees have multiple
negative health consequences from experiencing a bank robbery while at work, including
anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. This is unlikely to be very different in Italy
and therefore generates an additional cost.
Despite these frightening numbers, there is almost no empirical research in econom-
ics and very little research in criminology that has tried to study bank robberies using
robbery-level data. One likely reason for this is the lack of such data.
O2: The Expected Sentence Length
As described in the text, there are no official statistics in Italy providing information on
sentence lengths that condition on characteristics of the robbery. In order to obtain some
information about this, we hand-collected data on each bank robber who was sentenced
to prison in the Piedmont region, located in Northern Italy, between 2005 and 2007. For
each trial, we manually transcribed data from the official records at the Tribunale di
Torino (the Court of Turin). We collected data on the sentences given, as well as several
characteristics of the associated robberies and the robbers themselves. Table 8 shows the
summary statistics for the sample of 324 bank robberies attributed to the 96 different
bank robbers sentenced between 2005 and 2007. This implies that in the sample each
robber has been convicted for an average of 3.4 bank robberies.
The bank robbers are on average 35 years old, most are Italian (92%), and despite the
convictions coming from a Northern region, 35% were born in the south of Italy. Sixty-
seven percent of the robbers are recidivists and 33% accept a plea bargain. The other
variables vary by robbery. In 22% of the cases robbers use firearms (versus 15% from the
Italian Banking Association data), in 57% they wear a mask (versus 43%) and in 69%
they work in teams (versus 66%). Four percent of the time the robber takes hostages.
The average total haul is e12,406, slightly lower than the average total haul observed
in our main data. While the mix of modus operandi of robbers that were sentenced in
Piedmont is slightly different than in the countrywide robbery data of the Italian Banking
Association, the criminal law and, thus, the determinants of the sentence length should
be the same for all regions in Italy.
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The average sentence length is 3.5 years in prison. Data on sentence durations allow us
to model the log-sentence length based on the same modus operandi variables observed for
the bank robberies in our main dataset. In order to determine the way the modus operandi
shapes the expected sentence length S, we regress the log-sentence length on whether the
robber used firearms, was masked, or worked in a group. Estimates are shown in Table
9. Based on column 1, using a firearm increases the sentence by approximately 39%.
Working in groups and wearing a mask have a smaller effect on the sentence. Working
in groups increases the sentence length by 20%, and being disguised increases it by less
than 10%, but the effect is not statistically different from zero. In column 2, we also
control for recidivism, hostages, plea bargain, year, total number of (known) robberies
committed, and total haul. The magnitude of the coefficients on firearms, masks, and
groups all decrease, with only the use of firearms associated with strong and significant
sentencing enhancements. This potentially explains why so many robbers choose to work
in groups and to wear a mask, while significantly fewer use a firearm.
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Figure 6: Number of Italian Bank Robberies, Average Haul, and Number of Cas-
ualties
Notes: This figure shows the total number of Italian bank robberies (left axis), the average
haul (in e1,000s) and number of casualties (both on the right axis) between 1990 and 2006.
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Table 7: Number of Bank Robberies Across the World
Total Robberies R. per Branch (in %) Total Robberies R. per Branch (in %)
Andorra 0.00 0.00 Japan 133.29 0.98
Australia 119.00 2.54 Liechtenstein 0.00 0.00
Belgium 117.43 1.37 Lithuania 12.29 1.79
Bulgaria 1.00 0.32 Luxembourg 2.14 0.71
Canada 827.71 14.10 Malta 0.71 0.70
Croatia 27.43 2.45 Monaco 0.00 0.00
Cyprus 6.57 0.91 New Zealand 25.14 2.18
Czech Republic 66.29 4.08 Norway 11.86 0.96
Denmark 160.14 7.91 Poland 72.71 0.61
Estonia 1.71 0.69 Portugal 97.29 1.78
Finland 8.71 0.53 Slovak Republic 13.57 1.16
France 639.29 2.28 Slovenia 11.57 1.00
Germany 837.71 1.96 Spain 523.43 1.36
Greece 143.57 3.68 Sweden 38.86 2.00
Hungary 33.29 1.03 Switzerland 16.29 0.43
Iceland 2.71 1.66 The Netherlands 77.14 2.41
Ireland 64.57 5.22 Turkey 83.86 1.22
Italy 2770.86 8.67 UK 191.86 1.74
Source: European Banking Federation. Total Robberies are the average yearly number of robberies from 2000 to 2006.
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Table 8: Summary Statistics from Trials Related to Bank Robberies
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Characteristics of bank robbers
Age 35.774 10.217 18 65 93
Foreigner 0.083 0.278 0 1 96
Southern 0.354 0.481 0 1 96
Number of robberies 3.375 3.363 1 15 96
Recidivist 0.677 0.470 0 1 96
Plea bargain 0.333 0.474 0 1 96
Total sentence 3.458 1.639 1.333 12.667 95
Characteristics of robberies
Firearms 0.222 0.416 0 1 324
Masked 0.571 0.496 0 1 324
Group robbery 0.688 0.464 0 1 324
Hostages 0.040 0.197 0 1 324
Total haul 12.406 21.633 0 145 324
Year 2004.901 1.471 1993 2007 323
Notes: These data are based on trials against 96 bank robbers, involved in a
total of 324 bank robberies carried out between 1993 and 2007, that were held
in the judicial district of Piedmont.
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Table 9: Determinants of the Sentence Length
(1) (2)
log-Sentence
Firearms 0.39*** 0.28***
(0.10) (0.09)
Masked 0.07 0.03
(0.08) (0.08)
Group robbery 0.20** 0.09
(0.08) (0.08)
Number of robberies 0.03**
(0.02)
Recidivist -0.03
(0.08)
Hostages -0.10
(0.18)
Total haul 0.00
(0.00)
Plea bargain -0.27***
(0.08)
Year -0.02
(0.02)
Observations 95 94
R-squared 0.197 0.361
Notes: These regressions are based on trials against 96 bank robbers,
involved in a total of 324 bank robberies carried out between 1993 and
2007, that were held in the judicial district of Piedmont. Missing data on
sentence and year of sentencing cause us to lose one and two observations
in columns 1 and 2, respectively. Clustered standard errors (at the
province level) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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